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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the relationship between the use of stock options and bank risk 
in the context of the 2007-2008 financial crisis for banks that are authorised to accept 
deposits in the United Kingdom. These banks are affected by the European regulation 
on variable pay, but, to our knowledge, their usage of stock options has not been 
examined in previous studies. Paying bankers with stock options can generate two 
types of managerial incentives, namely, incentives to improve performance and 
incentives to take risk. Controlling for incentives to improve performance, we find 
that banks’ total risk and insolvency risk increase with the risk-taking incentives 
induced by stock options. We also find that this relationship is more pronounced 
surrounding the crisis period. The findings of this study can serve as institutionally 
relevant empirical support for the European regulation on variable pay.   
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1. Introduction 
There has been widespread concern that bankers’ variable pay has encouraged 
excessive risk-taking at financial institutions; this was claimed to have precipitated 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010; Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), 2009). According to the European Banking Authority (EBA), the 
ratio of variable-to-fixed pay of high earners (with pay brackets of EUR 1 million or 
more) at financial institutions in the United Kingdom (UK) was as high as 611% in 
2010, 346% in 2011 and 370% in 2012. In 2013, Capital Requirements Directive IV 
(Article 94, Directive 2013/36/EU) was introduced to limit the ratio of variable-to-
fixed pay of bankers to 100% (or 200% with the backing of a supermajority of 
shareholders).  
However, in the absence of relevant empirical evidence on the net risk-taking 
effect of variable pay, limiting variable pay can be seen as a contentious regulatory 
response to the issue of excessive risk-taking by financial institutions (Murphy, 2013). 
Such regulation was also challenged by the UK Treasury. Our study contributes 
relevant empirical evidence to rationalise the need for regulation. 
The Directive defines variable pay as payments or benefits that depend on 
performance, which certainly includes cash bonuses and stock options. While the 
regulation on cash bonuses necessarily assumes that bonuses must drive bank risk,1 
there is very limited empirical evidence on the role of other components of variable 
pay, such as stock options, that can be linked to the latest financial crisis. We feel that 
providing empirical evidence that relates to the crisis period will be useful in 
rationalising the European regulation on variable pay, especially when the use of 
                                                 
1 For example, the FSA (2009: 18) highlights that “Our concern in our review was, however, as much 
with the treatment of cash bonuses, which as noted above remain a significant proportion of total 
bonuses and typically not deferred.” 
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stock options is claimed to have provided bankers with incentives to take excessive 
risks during the time leading up to the financial crisis (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010). 
Our study differs in several ways from prior studies that examine stock options 
use and bank risk-taking in the United States (e.g., Belkhir and Chazi, 2010; Chen et 
al., 2006; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Houston and James, 1995). First, we examine 
a sample of banks incorporated in 29 countries that are authorised to accept deposits 
in the United Kingdom (UK). From a policy-making perspective, these are the banks 
that are affected by the recent regulatory reform, because these banks are involved in 
managing deposits in the UK.2 To our knowledge, the use of stock options across 
banks operating in the UK has not been previously investigated; hence, empirical 
evidence in this area is currently non-existent. There is a real need to enrich the 
literature with empirical evidence derived from these banks, as they are relevant 
regulatees who are affected by the European regulation on variable pay. Our study 
contributes to filling this gap. 
Second, the data used in previous studies on bank risk-taking are either 
significantly outdated (e.g. Chen et al., 2006; Houston and James, 1995) or do not 
include the crisis years (e.g. Belkhir and Chazi, 2010; Fortin et al., 2010). Therefore, 
the link between the use of stock options in bankers’ pay and the latest financial crisis 
cannot be directly inferred from their findings. It remains largely unknown whether 
the financial crisis was due in part to the use of stock options in bankers’ pay. If the 
statistically positive relationship between banks’ risk and the use of bankers’ stock 
options can be observed over time, one may question why the crisis occurred when it 
did. To address this question, data for non-crisis, pre-crisis and crisis periods are 
                                                 
2 Given the global reach of major banks and the very significant role of major non-UK-listed banks in 
London, the Walker Review Secretariat (2009) considers it is appropriate and necessary for broadly 
comparable disclosure on risk and remuneration to be implemented by FSA-authorised banks that are 
UK-domiciled subsidiaries of non-resident entities.  
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examined. Analysing different periods will provide clearer insight into the dynamic 
and significance of the relationship between banks’ risk and the use of bankers’ stock 
options over different economic climates. We do not underestimate the relevance of 
crisis period that triggered policy makers to regulate variable pay. Our study enriches 
the literature with empirical evidence that is relevant and generalisable to the context 
and time period in question. 
Our study documents three important findings. First, we find that banks’ total 
risk increases as bankers’ risk-taking incentives (generated through stock options) 
increases. Second, as a novel contribution of this study, we find that banks’ z-scores 
decrease as bankers’ risk-taking incentives increase, which suggests that banks’ 
greater insolvency risk is related to bankers’ higher risk-taking incentives induced by 
stock options. The empirical results are robust after controlling for potential 
endogeneity of risk-taking incentives. Risk-taking incentives also appear to determine 
banks’ risk when lagged values are used as part of robustness checks. Third, we also 
find that the relationship between banks’ risk and option-induced risk-taking 
incentives is more pronounced surrounding the crisis period. Overall, our findings are 
consistent with previous empirical evidence that suggests stock options induce 
bankers to increase bank risk-taking. They are also consistent with the commonly held 
view that bank failures and the financial crisis are unintended consequences of such 
perverse incentives (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010). Therefore, we suggest that there is 
a case for regulators to regulate bankers’ variable pay, such as stock options.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
relevant literature. Section 3 presents the hypotheses. Section 4 describes the 
empirical tests. Section 5 describes the data and descriptive statistics. Section 6 
reports the empirical results. Section 7 provides conclusions. 
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2. Literature Review  
2.1 Risk-Related Incentive Problems 
Studies on executive compensation have recognised that the use of stock options in 
executive pay can help mitigate risk-related incentive problems that arise between 
managers and shareholders of a firm (Guay, 1999). Risk-related incentive problems 
manifest when managers forego investment in risky projects due to their risk aversion, 
which is incongruent with the interests of firm shareholders who are less risk-averse 
(Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002). In discussing the moral hazard problem of banks, 
Bebchuk and Spamann (2010: 255) argue that “those who provide equity capital have 
an excessive incentive to take risk” with a view to maximising return.3 Stock options 
can be used to get bank managers to efficiently pursue shareholders’ interests in this 
way. 
 
2.2 Stock Options as Bankers’ Risk-Taking Incentives (Vega) 
The use of stock options not only mitigates risk-related incentive problems, but also 
discourages option holders from hedging against risk (e.g., Aretz and Bartram, 2010; 
Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002). This is because stock options have an important feature 
that can influence bankers’ attitudes towards risk. This feature is described as stock 
options’ vega, which is used in this study to measure bankers’ risk-taking incentives.  
As in previous studies (e.g., Belkhir and Chazi, 2010; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 
2002), a stock option’s vega is defined as the sensitivity of a stock option to a change 
                                                 
3 Gorton and Rosen (1995) argue that similar attitude can be held for bank executives who are also 
shareholders of the bank they manage. Several factors may explain why banks’ shareholders will have 
great incentives to encourage their managers to pursue risky investments. These factors have been 
widely discussed under the ‘moral hazard’ theme in the banking literature (e.g., Bebchuk and Spamann, 
2010; Ponce, 2010; Jeitschko and Jeung, 2005; Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Merton, 1977). The presence 
of limited liability coupled with deposit insurance (e.g., the Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
in the UK) and lenders of last resort (e.g., government bailouts) are factors that can induce banks’ 
shareholders (and managers with aligned interests) to bear excessive risk with a view to maximising 
return.    
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in stock price volatility. Guay (1999) establishes that stock options will significantly 
increase the sensitivity of a manager’s pay-related wealth to the underlying firm’s 
stock return volatility, which he describes as equity risk. Given that stock options’ 
value increases with firms’ equity risk, managers with stock options will have a 
greater incentive to undertake all risky positive NPV investments with a view to 
increasing the underlying firm’s equity risk and consequently the value of their stock 
options. The incentive to increase equity risk arises due to stock options’ asymmetric 
payoffs, whereby managers can cash out profit when the underlying firm’s share price 
increases as a result of successful risky investment, but will not suffer material cash 
outflow if the risky project fails.  
The relation between executive stock options and risk-taking by non-financial 
firms has been documented in several studies (Coles et al., 2006; Rajgopal and 
Shevlin, 2002). By examining a sample of oil and gas producers, Rajgopal and 
Shevlin (2002) find that option-induced risk-taking incentives are positively related 
with risky future exploration activities. They also find that such risk-taking incentives 
are negatively related with oil price hedging. Their findings suggest that stock options 
can induce managers to increase risk rather than manage risk. In addition, Coles et al. 
(2006) find that option-induced risk-taking incentives motivate riskier policy choices, 
such as more investment in research and development, low investment in property, 
plant and equipment, fewer lines of business and higher leverage.  
However, not many studies in banking examine the potential moral hazard 
arising from the use of stock options in bankers’ pay. Although some studies indicate 
that bank managers may have several reasons for favouring increases in banks’ 
investment risk, the role of stock options is not mentioned (e.g., Jeitschko and Jeung, 
2005; Gorton and Rosen, 2002). It is also observed that previous empirical findings 
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on the role of stock options are somewhat mixed, and have no direct link to the latest 
financial crisis (Belkhir and Chazi, 2010; Chen et al., 2006; Fortin et al., 2010; 
Houston and James, 1995).  
For example, based on a sample of commercial banks during the period 1980-
1990, Houston and James (1995) find no evidence that the use of stock options 
(measured by the ratio of options granted to cash pay) increases the level of banks’ 
risk (measured by the variance in banks’ stock returns). In a later study, Chen et al. 
(2006) examine commercial banks for the period 1992-2000 and find that the use of 
stock options (measured by the ratio of the value of stock options to total pay) 
increased tremendously in the banking industry during this time. The substantial 
presence of stock options could explain why Chen et al. (2006) find a significant 
relationship between option-based pay and market-based measures of banks’ risk. 
Similar results are documented in Fortin et al. (2010), who examine the use of stock 
options among banks in the United States for the pre-crisis year of 2005. 
 
3. Hypotheses  
The empirical studies discussed above do not distinguish between the two types of 
managerial incentives created by stock options, namely, incentives to improve 
performance and incentives to take risk. A more recent study by Belkhir and Chazi 
(2010) examines bank holding companies in the United States during a pre-crisis 
sample period of 1993-2006. By controlling for option-induced performance 
incentives (as measured by delta), they find that larger banks with better investment 
opportunities and those that operate in a deregulated environment tend to implement 
higher options’ vega (i.e., risk-taking incentives). They also document a significant 
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relationship between vega and market-based measures of banks’ risk. These empirical 
findings lead us to form the first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. There is a positive relationship between banks’ total risk and 
option-induced risk-taking incentives. 
 
Previous studies use market-based risk measures to proxy for banks’ risk (e.g., 
Belkhir and Chazi, 2010; Chen et al., 2006). Our study contributes to the existing 
literature by also considering a more extreme measure, which is insolvency risk. 
Some studies (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2010; Pathan, 2009) use z-score to measure 
banks’ insolvency risk. This is also a contributing aspect of our study, because several 
banks in the United Kingdom fundamentally reached insolvency state (or were bailed 
out) during the financial crisis (e.g., The Royal Bank of Scotland). To our knowledge, 
empirical evidence on the relation between banks’ insolvency risk and bankers’ risk-
taking incentives is scarce. Despite the pressure for regulatory reform on stock 
options (Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010) and the recent regulatory cap on variable-to-
fixed pay ratio (Article 94, Directive 2013/36/EU), it is largely unknown to what 
extent such variable pay is capable of producing risk-taking incentives that can 
increase banks’ insolvency risk. Previous empirical findings derived from market-
based risk measures lead us to form the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. There is a positive relationship between banks’ insolvency risk 
and option-induced risk-taking incentives. 
 
One notable gap in previous studies (e.g., Fortin et al., 2010) is that the 
findings are only applicable to the period before the financial crisis. If the relation 
between stock options use and banks’ risk is positively stable over time, one may 
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question why the crisis occurred when it did. To address this question, we divide our 
regression analysis into three periods: non-crisis, pre-crisis and crisis periods. This 
allows us to examine whether the relationship between risk-taking incentives and 
banks’ risk becomes more pronounced towards the crisis period. This leads to our 
third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. The relation between banks’ risk measures and option-induced 
risk-taking incentives strengthens surrounding and during the financial crisis 
period. 
 
4. Empirical Tests 
The following regression models are used to estimate the relation between banks’ risk 
and risk-taking incentives induced by stock options as measured by vega: 
 
Total riskjt= α+β1Vegajt+ ∑ βn
n
2 Controlsjt+γk+δt+εt    (1) 
z-scorejt= α+β1Vegajt+ ∑ βn
n
2 Controlsjt+γk+δt+εt    (2) 
 
To test the first hypothesis, the dependent variable Total riskjt represents 
stock return volatility for bank j during period t. Following many studies (e.g., Belkhir 
and Cazi, 2010; Fortin et al., 2010; Pathan, 2009; Chen et al., 2006), the bank’s total 
risk is calculated as the standard deviation of the bank’s daily stock returns for a given 
year. This measures the deviation of the bank’s stock returns from historical returns, 
which considers both systematic and unsystematic risks of the underlying stock.  
To test the second hypothesis, the inverse of the probability of insolvency as 
measured by z-score is used as another proxy for bank risk, which is a common 
approach in previous studies (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2010; Pathan, 2009). A higher 
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z-score indicates that the bank is more financially stable. Similar to the approach in 
Laeven and Levine (2010), the natural logarithm of z-score is used because the 
distribution of z-score values is highly skewed.   
In both Equations (1) and (2), the independent variable Vegajt denotes 
bankers’ risk-taking incentives induced by stock options. The regression models also 
include additional controls for year ( ) and country-specific factors (𝛾𝑘).  is an 
idiosyncratic error term. A country dummy is used to control for country-specific 
factors that may influence the compensation policies of banks incorporated in certain 
countries. Other control variables are factors deemed to be associated with bank risk-
taking as identified in the literature. These are: option-induced performance incentives 
as measured by delta (e.g., Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011), bank or firm size (e.g., 
Coles et al., 2006), derivatives usage (e.g., Rogers, 2002) and proportion of non-
executive directors on a bank’s board (e.g., Pathan, 2009). All variables are listed and 
defined in the Appendix. For the sake of brevity, the influence of these factors on 
bank risk-taking will be discussed in the results section. 
To address the third hypothesis, subsampling analyses based on non-crisis, 
pre-crisis and crisis years were undertaken. Non-crisis refers to the year 2005, which 
is remote from the crisis years. Non-crisis years are basically the time period that 
prior studies have focused on (e.g., Belkhir and Chazi, 2010; Chen et al., 2006; Fortin 
et al., 2010). The pre-crisis year 2006 is immediately before the crisis; in this year we 
anticipate the relation between executive vega and bank risk measures will begin to 
strengthen. A similar expectation is held for the crisis years of 2007 and 2008. Many 
studies have recognised that the financial crisis started to unfold in 2007 (e.g., Fortin 
et al., 2010; Brunnermeier, 2009). We follow these studies, and define the crisis years 
as 2007 and 2008. 
t jt
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5. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
5.1 Sample selection and description 
Our study examines banks that are authorised by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) to accept deposits in the United Kingdom. The sample period covers the years 
from 2005 to 2008. As shown in Table 1 (Panel A), 150 of these banks were 
incorporated in the United Kingdom, 98 banks were incorporated inside the European 
Economic Authority (excluding the United Kingdom) (EEA Ex-UK) and 83 were 
incorporated outside the EEA. With a view to producing a balanced panel and clean 
analysis that will allow us to observe the same sample of banks over the years, 202 
from a total of 331 banks (i.e., 61%) were eliminated from the sample because one or 
more of their annual reports published during the 2005-2008 period was not available.  
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Non-disclosure of detailed executive stock options data further reduced the 
sample size. Sixty-nine banks (53%) were eliminated from the remaining balance of 
129 banks, producing a sample of 60 banks: 11 banks (18%) were incorporated in the 
United Kingdom, 21 banks (35%) were incorporated inside the EEA Ex-UK and 28 
banks (47%) were incorporated outside the EEA. The sample consists of banks 
incorporated in 29 countries.4 Since our study covers a period of four years (i.e., 
2005-2008), the sample consists of a balanced panel of 240 bank-year observations.   
Panel B of Table 1 shows that of the 240 bank-year observations (i.e., 60 
banks), 76 bank-years (i.e., 19 banks) had disclosed not using stock options in their 
                                                 
4 The countries are the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, France, Spain, Saudi Arabia, 
Germany, Canada, Switzerland, India, Israel, Malaysia, Sweden, Singapore, South Africa, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, Turkey, China, Denmark, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Korea, Sri Lanka and Thailand. 
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executive compensation packages. Sixty-three per cent of these banks were 
incorporated outside the EEA. Thirty-six bank-years (i.e., 9 banks) disclosed using 
stock options without providing adequate details in their annual reports to permit 
analysis. We suspect that these banks may have awarded stock options in the past and 
may well have chosen not to grant stock options during our sample period. Similar to 
some industrial firms, some banks may choose not to grant stock options for every 
year. This happened to six bank-years in 2007-2008.  
In addition, stock options were not granted during 2005-2008 in 49% (i.e., 
118/240) of the studied bank-years. Therefore, our first subsample consists of 118 
bank-years in which executive directors were not awarded with stock options during 
the sample period. About 55% of this subsample is made up of banks incorporated 
outside the EEA. This observation may suggest that the use of stock options has not 
been as widespread in some countries.5  
The second subsample consists of 122 bank-years in which executive stock 
options were granted, and in which adequate details of option grants were disclosed in 
annual reports that enables us to calculate the options’ vega. This subsample of 122 
bank-years is well-diversified because 29%, 33% and 38% of them are incorporated 
in the UK, inside the EEA Ex-UK and outside the EEA, respectively.  
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Due to a 
lack of research, the recent magnitude of executive stock options in the UK banking 
                                                 
5 We have no convincing argument to suggest that the compensation structures of the US banks has 
been replicated by banks operating elsewhere. There could be several reasons to explain this 
phenomenon, which is beyond the scope of our current study. 
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industry remains largely unknown.6 For the full sample (i.e., 240 observations), the 
average ratio of stock options’ value to the total executive compensation is 24%, 
which is comparable to the 26% reported in Chen et al. (2006). The average Black-
Scholes value of accumulated stock options is £5.3 million. The average magnitude of 
stock options is much greater for the sample that considers only bank-years with stock 
option grants (i.e., 122 observations). For this subsample, the average ratio of stock 
options’ value to total pay is 45%, and the average options’ value is £10.3 million. 
Therefore, stock options constitute a substantial component of executive pay. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
  
The average options’ vega, or risk-taking incentives, which is the focus of our 
study, is 0.03 for the full sample and 0.05 for the subsample. For the subsample of 
122 bank-years, the value of stock options changes by 5%, for a 1% change in the 
underlying stock volatility. This is comparable to the 0.06 reported for a sample of US 
banks in Belkhir and Cazi (2010). This figure is also lower than the 0.09 reported for 
US industrial firms (Belkhir and Cazi, 2010). Comparing the stock options’ vega of 
banks with that of industrial firms, however, is not important. This is because vega 
can induce bankers to increase banks’ risk, and a failure to control this may result in 
excessive risk-taking that can adversely affect other stakeholders in the economy, 
given the intermediary role that banks play. 
It is common to observe vega to be much lower than delta (see, for example, 
Coles et al., 2006). The average option’s delta, as a measure of option-induced 
                                                 
6 A survey of the seven largest banks in the UK over the 2003-2007 period does not reveal the 
magnitude of bank executives’ stock options (Marshall, 2009). 
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performance incentive, for the full sample is 0.24. For the sample that considers only 
bank-years with stock option grants, the average delta is 0.46. This means that a stock 
option will change in value by 46 pence for every pound of change in the value of 
underlying bank stock. This figure is lower than the 0.64 reported in Lee et al. (2007) 
for industrial firms in the UK. According to John and Qian (2003), low pay-
performance sensitivity is an accepted feature of the banking industry.7  
 Following the approach in Core and Guay (1999), the average stock option’s 
delta is multiplied by 1% of the bank’s stock price, which yields an average of 
£65,618. Our figure is higher than the $60,587 reported in Belkhir and Cazi (2010) for 
a sample of banks operating in the US. In the case of stock option’s vega, our figure is 
£2,136, which is lower than the $5,935 reported in the US. It is obvious that direct 
comparisons are not possible because different sample periods are used, but it seems 
that risk-taking incentives are higher among bank executives operating in the US.8     
The average stock return volatility for the full sample is 1.9%, which is 
slightly higher than the 1.8% reported in Chen et al. (2006). The average of the 
natural logarithm of z-score is 1.23, which is lower than the 2.88 reported in Laeven 
and Levine (2010). A higher total risk and insolvency risk observed in our study can 
be most likely attributed to the high volatility and insolvency risk faced by our sample 
banks around the financial crisis period.  
 
6. Empirical Results 
6.1. Bank risk and option-induced risk-taking incentives (vega) 
                                                 
7 John and Qian (2003) document that the pay-performance sensitivity in banks is $4.7 per $1,000 
increase in shareholder value. This is lower than the $6 per $1,000 increase in shareholder value in 
manufacturing firms. 
8 This observation is consistent with Conyon and Murphy’s (2000) suggestion that American 
executives may be less risk-averse than their counterparts elsewhere. 
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The relation between banks’ risks and risk-taking incentives induced by stock options 
is examined using multivariate regressions to control for the effect of variables that 
are significantly related to stock volatility and z-score. Vega is used instead of value 
of stock options, as a more appropriate measure of bank executives’ risk-taking 
incentives. We reduce the possibility of a serious multicollinearity problem by 
ensuring that the variance inflations factors (vif) for independent variables in the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions are less than 10. The regression results are 
presented in Table 3.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
As described in Table 3, the dependent variable for Column 1 is banks’ total risk, as 
measured by banks’ stock return volatility. Column 1 reports that in the presence of 
performance incentives (delta), vega increases with banks’ total risk. Delta is an 
important control variable because performance incentives constrain the risk-taking 
incentives provided through vega (Coles et al., 2006). This is evidenced by the 
observed negative relationship between delta and banks’ total risk. A lower proportion 
of non-executives on board may imply greater monitoring difficulties to restrain 
executives’ risk-taking. This argument can well explain the observed negative 
relationship between a bank’s total risk and the proportion of non-executives on the 
board. Another interesting observation is that banks with higher total risk are those 
classified as derivative traders.9       
The results reported in Column 1 of Table 3 are consistent with the first 
hypothesis, which suggests that stock options structured with greater risk-taking 
                                                 
9 The relation between derivative trading and bank risk-taking is an interesting aspect for further 
investigation, but is beyond the scope of this study. 
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incentives will induce bankers to increase banks’ risk. To what extent the option-
induced risk-taking incentives contribute to a bank’s failure is another interesting 
issue to explore. Empirical results to address this issue, which is related to our second 
hypothesis, are presented in Column 3 of Table 3. 
Column 3 of Table 3 reports the results on the relation between banks’ 
insolvency risk and risk-taking incentives induced by stock options. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of z-score. A bank with a lower z-score is exposed to 
higher insolvency risk. Consistent with the second hypothesis, Column 3 shows that 
after controlling for stock options’ delta, banks with higher stock options’ vega are 
associated with lower z-scores. Our findings suggest that banks that implement higher 
vega for their managers will be less financially stable, and hence exposed to greater 
insolvency risk. Our results are robust after controlling for several other factors that 
may also influence banks’ insolvency risk. 
 
6.2. Endogeneity/causation issues 
While the preceding discussion is based on the assumption that stock options’ vega 
determines bank risk, it is also possible that causation works the other way round. 
Vega and bank risk could also be jointly determined by some unobservable factors. 
To isolate causation and address potential endogeneity problems, we estimate 
simultaneous systems of equations (i.e., 2SLS), which is a common approach used in 
many studies (e.g., Rogers, 2002; Coles et al., 2006).  
The jointly determined variables in question are vega and bank risk. In the first 
stage regression, vega is set as a dependent variable. The specification used to predict 
vega is based on variables commonly used in the literature (e.g., Guay, 1999; Rogers, 
2002; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006), which are: executive cash 
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compensation, delta, bank risk, size, growth opportunities, country dummy and year 
dummy. These variables are regressed on vega in order to produce the predicted 
values of vega. Cash compensation and growth opportunities are set as instrumental 
variables because the unreported regressions show that they do not affect bank risk. 
The second stage regression sets the predicted value of vega as an explanatory 
variable that can explain bank risk. %Ownership (i.e., the percentage of equity 
ownership held by bank executives) is added as an additional explanatory variable to 
proxy for risk aversion, which is an unobservable factor that can influence bankers’ 
characteristics or investment decisions. The results of the 2SLS are reported in Table 
3 (Columns 2 and 4). In a further robustness check, we also mitigate the causality 
concern by using one-year lagged values of vega as determinants of bank risk. The 
results are consistent with those reported in Table 3.10 
 
6.3. Banks’ total risk and option-induced risk-taking incentives (vega) during non-
crisis, pre-crisis and crisis periods 
Our empirical results so far are consistent with the findings of previous studies 
regarding the positive relation between executive stock options’ vega and bank risk-
taking (e.g., Belkhir and Chazi, 2010). Our study also contributes to the existing 
literature by examining the interaction between executive vega and bank risk-taking 
during non-crisis, pre-crisis and crisis periods. This approach, which has not been 
implemented in previous studies, can provide a clear insight about the commonly held 
view that the financial crisis was caused in part by the use of stock options in bankers’ 
pay. The results related to our third hypothesis are presented in Tables 4 and 5.  
 
                                                 
10 For the sake of brevity, the results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The dependent variable in Table 4 is banks’ total risk. Column 1 reports the results for 
the non-crisis period, which refers to the year 2005. Throughout this period, the 
relation between stock options’ vega and banks’ total risk is not statistically 
significant. As shown in Column 2, the relation begins to strengthen significantly 
during the pre-crisis period of 2006. A similar trend is observed throughout the crisis 
period, as reported in Column 3. Based on these results, it can be gathered that the 
relation between options’ vega and banks’ total risk is not stable over time. It seems 
that banks’ total risk began to increase more in tandem with vega surrounding the 
crisis period. In unreported statistics, we observe that the dollar value of stock 
options’ vega increased tremendously, by 68% on average, from £1,607 in 2005 to 
£2,705 in 2006. This suggests that bank executives had much greater risk-taking 
incentives surrounding the crisis period than in the period before the crisis. It is 
plausible that this factor induced even greater risk-taking among banks, which 
eventually reached its peak when the crisis erupted in the following year. 
 
6.4. Banks’ insolvency risk and option-induced risk-taking incentives (vega) during 
non-crisis, pre-crisis and crisis periods 
The dependent variable in Table 5 is banks’ z-score as the inverse of insolvency risk. 
As reported in Column 1, the relation between stock options’ vega and banks’ z-score 
is not statistically significant throughout the non-crisis year of 2005. As shown in 
Column 2, the relation begins to strengthen significantly surrounding the crisis period. 
A similar trend is observed throughout the crisis period, as reported in Column 3. 
Similar to the case of banks’ total risk, the relation between vega and banks’ 
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insolvency risk seems unstable over time. Banks’ insolvency risk began to increase 
more in tandem with vega around the crisis period. These results suggest that a large 
increase in stock options’ vega from 2005 to 2006 did influence bank managers to 
increase the riskiness of their banks’ investment portfolios, which simultaneously 
placed the banks in an unstable financial position.  
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
There are at least two alternative arguments that suggest that even during the 
height of the crisis bank managers acted recklessly, and shifted towards even riskier 
investments. First, shareholders, together with bank managers with stock options, may 
have behaved this way due to the presence of limited liability. Given the presumably 
deteriorating value of the banks at this point, they have had little to lose from the 
downside of potentially risky investment projects, but stand to gain enormously had 
the projects turn out to be successful (Louise, 2011). This implies that the ‘limited 
liability’ condition induced them to shift towards riskier investments during crisis, 
which can be costly to creditors.11 
Second, during a crisis period, debt overhang may impede shareholders and 
hence bank managers, as their agents, from executing positive NPV projects, because 
the gains from those projects partially or primarily will go to existing creditors instead 
of shareholders (Myers, 1977). In this scenario, the risk-taking incentives induced by 
stock options can be very useful to induce managers of distressed banks presumably 
facing a debt overhang scenario to continue pursuing risky investments, with the hope 
                                                 
11 This line of argument has been accepted by legal scholars to justify greater creditor protection during 
financial crisis or a firm’s insolvency (Louise, 2011). 
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of creating value. During such crisis periods, managers with stock options will be 
induced to continue investing in risky loans to create value, although this might 
benefit debtholders more than shareholders of the distressed banks. This line of 
argument does suggest that managers may shift towards still riskier investments 
during a crisis period, when they are incentivised to do so through vega. Such reckless 
risk-taking behaviour explains why bankers suffered large losses during the crisis 
(Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010). 
Finally, consistent with the observations made by previous studies (e.g., 
Belkhir and Chazi, 2010; Fortin et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2006), Column 1 of Table 3 
reports that smaller banks, as in the case of smaller firms, tend to be riskier than larger 
banks, as measured by their stock returns volatility. Iliquidity may play a role, 
because the largest banks are the main beneficiaries of significant too-big-to-fail 
implicit subsidies. However, the inverse link between bank size and bank riskiness is 
disputable, and may indeed be a subject for further research. For example, prior 
studies find that large banks tend to be associated with greater insolvency risk (e.g., 
Bhagat et al., 2012; Pathan, 2009). As reported in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 and 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5, larger banks seem to have been exposed to higher 
insolvency risk, especially surrounding and during the crisis period. One may argue 
that this can be consistent with some anecdotal evidence of bailouts involving large 
and systematically important banks such as the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds 
TSB in the United Kingdom.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This study is built upon the often-held view that stock options induce 
managers to invest in risky investment activities (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Rajgopal and 
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Shevlin 2002). Regulating variable pay has been the main agenda of European 
regulators as part of their post-crisis response. Although prior studies (e.g., Bebchuk 
and Spamann, 2010; Belkhir and Chazi, 2010; Chen et al., 2006) have linked banks’ 
risk-taking to the use of stock options in bankers’ pay, their empirical evidence does 
not directly relate to the crisis period. This research gap motivated our study to 
provide empirical evidence on the relation between bankers’ stock options and banks’ 
risk-taking in the context of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. Most importantly, our 
study contributes empirical evidence derived from banks that are affected by the 
European Directive. We are not aware of previous studies on bankers’ stock options 
that examine such a data set. Such empirical evidence can help enrich the discourse 
about the relative restriction on variable pay, which is imposed through the 
implementation of CRD IV (Article 94, Directive 2013/36/EU).  
We find that banks’ total risk and insolvency risk increases with the risk-
taking incentives induced by bankers’ stock options. The empirical results are robust 
after controlling for option-induced performance incentives and potential endogeneity 
of vega. Risk-taking incentives also appear to determine banks’ risk when lagged 
values of vega are used during robustness checks. We also find that this relationship is 
more pronounced surrounding the crisis period. The subsampling results imply that 
the strength of a short-term (i.e., yearly) relation between vega and banks’ risk 
measures is dynamic. Our findings, taken together, are consistent with the often-held 
view that paying bankers with stock options had induced them to increase banks’ risk-
taking as occurred during the crisis period (e.g., Bebchuk and Spamann, 2010).  
The findings of this study shed further light on, and enrich our understanding 
of, the concern that bankers’ stock options played an important role in fuelling the 
financial crisis. By implication, one can suggest that, apart from other factors already 
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established in the literature, the financial crisis was due in part to the use of stock 
options in bankers’ pay. We therefore suggest that the implementation of a relative 
cap on variable pay through the implementation of CRD IV should be welcomed as 
part of regulatory efforts to restrict the use of perverse incentives induced by stock 
options.  
Nevertheless, there are caveats and suggestions for future research. First, the 
limited scope of our study prevents us from (definitively) suggesting whether the level 
of variable pay or the ratio of variable-to-fixed pay should be regulated. A more 
deliberate effort to prohibit the use of stock options (such as that imposed on the 
recipients of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the US) could also be 
worthy of consideration (Murphy, 2013). The evaluation of these alternative policy 
prescriptions is very much an interesting subject matter for further debate and 
research. Second, it is also important to bear in mind that a chosen policy prescription 
may not yield the desired result, and may even lead to unintended consequences. For 
example, curtailing variable pay through taxes may lead to even higher variable pay 
(Dietl et al., 2013). Finally, depending on data availability, future research can also 
investigate the influence of option-induced risk-taking incentives on investment 
decisions. A small but growing number of studies have started to explore managers’ 
investment decisions (e.g., Huang et al. (2011) on fund managers’ investment 
decisions). Greater disclosure in the future will allow researchers to determine to what 
extent bankers’ investment decisions can be induced through the use of stock options.     
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Variable definitions 
Variable Name Definitions  
Bank executives’ stock options  
Vega Option-induced risk-taking incentives; the average sensitivity of 
executives’ stock option to equity risk. 
Delta Option-induced performance incentives; the average sensitivity 
of executives’ stock option to the bank’s stock price. 
  
Banks’ risk measures  
Total risk The standard deviation or volatility of the banks’ stock returns.  
z-score The banks’ return on assets plus the capital asset ratio, divided by 
standard deviations of returns. The score represents the inverse of 
the probability of insolvency; banks with a higher z-score are 
more financially stable. 
  
Control variables  
Bank size The natural logarithm of total assets. 
Derivatives hedger A dummy variable that equals one if the banks use derivatives 
for hedging, and zero otherwise. 
Derivatives trader A dummy variable that equals one if the banks use derivatives 
for trading, and zero otherwise. 
%Non-Exec Number of non-executive directors divided by the number of 
board members. 
%Ownership The percentage of equity ownership held by executives. 
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TABLE 1  
Sample Selection and Description  
 Panel A. Sample Selection  
 Banks incorporated in:   
 UK 
Inside EEA 
Ex-UK Outside EEA Total 
Banks authorised to accept deposits in the  
    United Kingdom (UK) 150 (45%) 98 (30%) 83 (25%) 331 
At least one annual report published 
    during the 2005-2008 period was not  
    available   114 (56%) 66 (33%) 22 (11%) 202 
 36 (28%) 32 (25%) 61 (47%) 129 
Usage/non-usage of stock options was not  
    disclosed during 2005-2008  25 (36%) 11 (16%) 33 (48%) 69 
Total banks 11 (18%) 21 (35%) 28 (47%) 60 
Total bank-years (i.e. 60 × 4 years)    240 
 
 Panel B. Sample Description  
 Bank-years incorporated in:   
 UK 
Inside EEA 
Ex-UK Outside EEA Total 
Bank-years disclosed not using stock   
    options 4 (5%) 24 (32%) 48 (63%) 76 
Bank-years did not grant stock options  
    during 2005-2008 1 (17%) 0 (0%) 5 (83%) 6 
Bank-years disclosed as using but did not  
    grant stock options during 2005-2008 4 (11%) 20 (56%) 12 (33%) 36 
Bank-years without stock option grants 9 (8%) 44 (37%) 65 (55%) 118 
Bank-years with stock option grants and  
    disclosure of details during 2005-2008  35 (29%) 40 (33%) 47 (38%) 122 
Total bank-years  44 (18%) 84 (35%) 112 (47%) 240 
     
 
The table reports the sample selection criteria and description for the sample of 240 bank-years during 
2005-2008. The full sample contains 122 bank-years that granted stock options and 118 bank-years that 
did not grant stock options to their executive directors. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   Option/Tot. Pay 240 0.24 0.32 0.00 0.98 
      
   Tot. Option Value (£000) 240 5,252 11,000 0.0 70,600 
      
   Vega 240 0.03 0.07 0.0 0.41 
      
   Vega (£000) 240 2 7 0.0 75 
      
   Delta 240 0.24 0.37 0.0 0.99 
      
   Delta (£000) 240 65 177 0.0 1,427 
      
   Stock Volatility 240 0.019 0.011 0.004 0.072 
      
   Ln(z-score) 240 1.23 0.87 -2.81 5.27 
      
   Ln(Size) 240 25.16 1.86 18.54 28.39 
      
   Derivatives Hedger 240 0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 
      
   Derivatives Trader 240 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 
      
  %Non-Exec 240 0.80 0.17 0.27 1.00 
      
  %Ownership 240 0.004 0.009 0.000 0051 
      
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of 240 bank-years during 2005-2008. The full 
sample contains 122 bank-years that granted stock options and 118 bank-years that did not grant stock 
options to their executive directors. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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TABLE 3 
Bank risk and option-induced risk-taking incentives (vega) 
 
 Period: 2005-2008 
  Total Risk   z-score   
   OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS    
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    
Vega  0.011 *** 0.035 *** -0.136 * -0.303 ***  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.077) (0.007)  
Delta  -0.004 *** -0.009 *** 0.062 *   
  (0.007) (0.004) (0.095)   
Bank Size  -0.004 *** -0.001 -0.201 *** -0.142 ***  
  (0.005) (0.195) (0.000) (0.000)  
%Non-Exec  -0.101 *** -0.037 ***    
  (0.000) (0.002)    
Derivatives Trader  0.018 *** 0.004 -0.429 *** 0.035  
  (0.004) (0.500) (0.005) (0.803)  
Derivatives Hedger    -0.319 0.010  
    (0.176) (0.960)  
%Ownership  -0.004 *** -0.001 ** 0.053 ** 0.068 ***  
  (0.000) (0.024) (0.014) (0.000)  
Intercept  0.169 *** 0.078 ** 6.600 *** 5.571 ***  
  (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000)  
       
Country dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year dummy  Yes Yes Yes Yes  
       
No. of observations  240 240 240 240  
R2  0.45 0.02 0.56 0.25  
Max vif  4.28  4.31   
Mean vif  1.74  1.65   
  
The table presents the results for OLS (Columns 1 and 3) and 2SLS (Columns 3 and 4) regressions for 
a sample of 240 bank-years during 2005-2008. The dependent variable is banks’ total risk (Columns 1 
and 2) and insolvency risk (Columns 3 and 4). Total risk is measured by the standard deviation of stock 
returns. A lower z-score indicates a higher insolvency risk. Vega measures bank executives’ risk-
taking incentives induced by stock options. Delta measures bank executives’ performance incentives. 
%Ownership is the percentage of equity ownership held by executives. Other variables are defined in 
the Appendix. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10. The p-values are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 4 
Banks’ total risk and option-induced risk-taking incentives (vega) 
during non-crisis, pre-crisis and crisis periods   
 
 Non-
crisis 
 
Pre-
Crisis 
 Crisis 
 
2005  2006   
 2007-
2008 
   
 (1)  (2)    (3)    
Vega 0.008 0.025 ***  0.015 ***  
 (0.579) (0.009)  (0.001)  
Delta -0.004 -0.007 *  -0.004 *  
 (0.461) (0.061)  (0.063)  
Bank Size -0.003 -0.003  -0.003  
 (0.418) (0.346)  (0.171)  
%Non-Exec -0.107 * -0.062  -0.070 **  
 (0.057) (0.139)  (0.010)  
Derivatives Trader 0.033 * 0.039 **  0.015  
 (0.093) (0.021)  (0.237)  
Intercept 0.199 * 0.160  0.153 ***  
 (0.080) (0.100)  (0.010)  
      
Country dummy Yes Yes  Yes  
      
No. of observations 60 60  120  
R2 0.39 0.55  0.36  
Max vif 7.44 5.59  3.59  
Mean vif 1.88 1.82  1.74  
 
The table presents the results for OLS regressions for a sample of 60 banks (Columns 1 and 
2) and 120 bank-years (Column 3). The dependent variable is banks’ total risk as measured 
by the standard deviation of stock returns. Vega measures bank executives’ risk-taking 
incentives induced by stock options. Delta measures bank executives’ performance 
incentives. Other variables are defined in the Appendix. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10. 
The p-values are in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5 
Banks’ insolvency risk and option-induced risk-taking incentives (vega) 
during non-crisis, pre-crisis and crisis periods   
 
 Non-
crisis 
 
Pre-
Crisis 
 Crisis 
 
2005  2006   
 2007-
2008 
  
 
 (1)  (2)    (3)    
Vega -0.159 -0.324 *  -0.272 **  
 (0.383) (0.099)  (0.030)  
Delta 0.080 0.100  0.125 *  
 (0.288) (0.210)  (0.062)  
Bank Size 0.048 -0.199 **  -0.381 ***  
 (0.376) (0.011)  (0.001)  
Derivatives Trader -0.525 ** -0.655 **  -0.624 *  
 (0.030) (0.048)  (0.083)  
Derivatives Hedger -0.300 -0.509  -0.503  
 (0.459) (0.317)  (0.179)  
Intercept -0.277 6.403 ***  10.632 ***  
 (0.839) (0.002)  (0.000)  
      
Country dummy Yes Yes  Yes  
      
No. of observations 60 60  120  
R2 0.73 0.62  0.54  
Max vif 7.52 5.79  3.56  
Mean vif 1.79 1.71  1.56  
 
The table presents the results for OLS regressions for a sample of 60 banks (Columns 1 
and 2) and 120 bank-years (Column 3). The dependent variable is the inverse of insolvency 
risk (measured by z-score). A lower z-score indicates a higher insolvency risk. Vega 
measures bank executives’ risk-taking incentives induced by stock options. Delta measures 
bank executives’ performance incentives. Other variables are defined in the Appendix. 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05 and *p<0.10. The p-values are in parentheses. 
      
      
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
